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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND THE TRADITION 
IN ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY 
John Edward RUSSON 
RÉSUMÉ : La méthode historique qu'utilise Aristote à l'égard de ses prédécesseurs trouve sa jus-
tification dans sa psychologie et son épistémologie. La définition aristotélicienne de l'âme 
dans le De Anima implique que toute connaissance est l'unification du sujet et de l'objet et 
l'animation d'un corps. La notion d'« habituation », dans les Seconds Analytiques //, 19, 
montre comment cela s'applique à l'intellect. L'animation de l'objet (son corps) par l'esprit 
dans la compréhension intellectuelle est complète uniquement quand ce qui comprend se re-
connaît comme le remplissement exigé par son objet. Ce principe qui justifie Aristote de se 
considérer comme l'accomplissement de sa tradition rend obligatoire aussi que notre compré-
hension de sa philosophie soit adéquate à ses textes. 
SUMMARY: Aristotle's "historical method" in his approach to his predecessors is the one de-
manded by his psychology and epistemology. Aristotle's definition of soul in De Anima implies 
that all knowing is a unification of subject and object and is the animating of a body. The no-
tion of habituation in Posterior Analytics 11.19 shows how this applies to intellect. The mind's 
animating of its object (its body) in intellectual comprehension is only complete when the 
comprehending recognizes itself as the fulfillment for which its object has been asking. This 
very principle which justifies Aristotle's portrayal of himself as the fulfillment of his tradition 
requires that our comprehension of Aristotle's philosophy likewise recognize itself as the ful-
fillment of his texts. 
INTRODUCTION 
I t is characteristic of Aristotle's method that he begins his analyses by calling a counsel of his philosophical ancestors, and that he only articulates his own posi-
tion once he has let his study of his tradition provide him with a conceptual matrix 
within which to situate his own investigations ; the best examples of this approach 
are found in Metaphysics A, and in Book I of the text which will provide the focus 
for this study, De Anima. While it is a commonplace to write off this aspect of Aris-
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totle's work as interesting source material, but neither scientific in its own right, nor, 
indeed, essential to Aristotle's project, I will argue on the contrary both (a) that this 
canvassing of the tradition is essential to Aristotle's project, and (b) that the form of 
his approach is not only methodologically sound but, further, that it is the precise 
method demanded by his psychology and epistemology. 
The criticism of Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors is familiar and it is typi-
fied by this remark of Burnet : 
As a rule, Aristotle's statements about early philosophers are far less historical than 
Plato's. He nearly always discusses the facts from the point of view of his own system. 
[...] He is convinced that his own philosophy accomplishes what all previous philosophers 
had aimed at, and their systems are therefore regarded as "lisping" attempts to formulate 
it.1 
There are basically two criticisms here, or two stages of one criticism : first, Ar-
istotle appraises the others in his terms, and, second, he views his own system as the 
consummation of the earlier attempts. In other words, in looking at the other, Aris-
totle only sees himself, and, indeed this self-cognizance is posited as the very goal of 
the other. The response to this challenge has three parts. 
I begin by considering Aristotle's approach to his predecessors in Book I of De 
Anima, and draw two conclusions. First, Aristotle's definition of soul in Book II of 
De Anima appears as simply a unified statement of the claims made by the tradition. 
Second, the motivation and methodological justification for formulating such a uni-
fied statement itself appears as a demand made by the tradition, and Aristotle's action 
of philosophical retrospection appears in turn as the conclusion of a practical syllo-
gism for which the philosophical tradition itself is the agent. This first section pro-
vides the basic form which the answer to our problematic takes, but it also introduces 
a number of theses which it is the project of the remainder of the paper to defend. 
The second part is the main argumentative focus of the paper, and it is an elabo-
rate argument for a unified interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and epistemology. 
The argument here posits a doctrine of dynamic holism as the logical key to Aristotle 
physics, and the philosophy of mind and epistemology which it includes.2 This be-
gins with an analysis of soul as the principle of identification with otherness, and 
moves through an account of ëÇiç as development and mediation to an interpretation 
of voûç as self-cognition as the i l frv eivai of a tradition. Along the way it becomes 
clear that Aristotle has an animative theory of cognition, according to which knowing 
is the act of bringing the object to life, as opposed to a representative theory, accord-
ing to which the mind is a passive theatre. 
1. J. BURNET, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th ed. (Meridian Books, 1957), p. 31. 
2. My argument bears on Aristotle's alleged functionalism : see R. SORABJI, "Body and Soul in Aristotle," 
Philosophy, 49 (1974), revised and reprinted in J. BARNES, R. SORABJI and M. SCHOFIELD, eds, Articles on 
Aristotle in 4 volumes, (Duckworth, 1975-1979), vol. IV, p. 42-64 ; H. ROBINSON, "Mind and Body in Ar-
istotle," Classical Quarterly, n.s. 28 (1978) : p. 105-124; R. HEINAMEN, "Aristotle and the Mind-Body 
Problem," Phronesis, 35 (1990) : p. 83-102. Compare A. BEN-ZEEV, "Making Mental Properties More 
Natural," Monist, 69 (1968) : p. 434-446. 
778 
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRADITION IN ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY 
The third part takes the epistemological conclusions reached in Part Two, and 
explicitly draws out their implications for the philosophy of history as it relates to 
Aristotle's method of finding a rationality in his tradition by forcing it to interpret it-
self, and concludes in a justification of the method of analysis used in this essay. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEFINITION OF SOUL 
Aristotle's ultimate goal is to know the substance of soul as embodied in a defi-
nition from which its attributes can be deduced.3 To find this definition requires be-
ginning with the already recognized attributes, and working up from these to the 
knowledge of the substance. Consequently, Aristotle begins De Anima with this re-
mark regarding the immediate method and goal of the inquiry : 
[...] when we are able to give an account conformable to experience [iccrrà Tn,v (fxxv-caaiav] 
of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most favorable position to 
say something worth saying [ëÇonev Xéyeiv KaAÀiaxa] about the essential nature of that 
subject [Tcepi rn,ç oùaiaç] (I.1.402b22-25, trans. J.A. Smith). 
There will be reason later to consider both the phrase "Korea tf]v <|>avTacio:v" and the 
phrase "ë£ou.ev téyeiv KàMaora," but for now it is sufficient to see in this remark 
an expression of the need to begin from the attributes which are "familiar to us" in 
order to get at the real essence or substance of the matter (ovoid). 
But where are the explananda — the attributes — to be found ? For Aristotle, the 
primary resource is the history of speculation about the soul ; thus, in Chapters 2 
through 5 of Book I, Aristotle questions the tradition for his starting points. He be-
gins Chapter 2 by expressing this need to consult his heritage : 
It is necessary for us looking on about the soul and being without a way through that 
through which we need passage, progressing, to take along beside us the opinions of as 
many of those who came before as showed forth something about it [the soul] so that we 
may take up what has been justly said, and so that, if something has not been justly said, 
we may beware of it ; and it is necessary at the beginning of the search to lay down what is 
especially reputed to belong to it [the soul] by nature, (I.2.403b20-25, my trans.). 
To find our way about it is necessary to situate ourselves with respect to the tradi-
tion : we must discover the soul's reputation. This reputation is the received starting 
point indicated in the quotation from Chapter 1 : we are to account for the attributes 
Korea TTJV ^avtaoiav, that is, we must align ourselves with what has been "made 
visible." 
Aristotle further characterizes this "making visible" of the attributes of soul by 
his predecessors : 
3. For opposed accounts of Aristotle's notion of demonstrative science, see J. BARNES, "Aristotle's Theory of 
Demonstration," Phronesis, 14 (1969), reprinted in BARNES et al, 1975-1979, vol. I, p. 123-152 ; and R.G. 
COLLINGWOOD, "Aristotle's Metaphysics," in An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford, 1940), p. 3-10 ; my sym-
pathies lie closer to Collingwood's account. J. OWENS, "Aristotle's Definition of Soul," Philomathes, R.B. 
PALMER and R. HAMERTON-KELLY, eds (Nijhoff, 1971), reprinted in J. CATAN, éd., Aristotle : The Col-
lected Papers of Joseph Owens (SUNY, 1981), p. 109-121, considers the definition of soul in terms of the 
Posterior Analytics. See below, nn 26, 32. 
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Indeed, the ensouled is reputed to differ from the unsouled in two ways in particular : in 
movement and in sensation ; and we have nearly accepted these two things about the soul 
from those who have come before us, (I.2.403b25-28, my trans.).4 
Aristotle proceeds to develop the account of how soul had been viewed in relation to 
movement, and how in relation to sensation. In both cases, Aristotle contends, there 
had been a general tendency to treat the soul as itself bodily, and for this reason the 
earlier investigations into soul were not completely successful. 
The soul had been treated as "bodily" to the extent that the assumption had gen-
erally been made that cause and the effect are "like" ; thus the cause of movement 
was assumed to be itself in motion (I.2.403b28-31), and knowing was assumed to be 
of like by like (L2.405M5-16). Since, Aristotle argues, movement involves place and 
place involves bodiliness, the first assumption — that soul is itself in motion — leads 
to the conclusion that soul is itself a body (I.3.406al5-16, bl-3) ; similarly, since 
what is known are things composed of material elements, if like knows like, then the 
soul too is composed of material elements (I.2.404bl 1-18 ; 1.5 passim). In both cases, 
then, the old psychologies imply, perhaps unwittingly, that the soul is a body. Aris-
totle's position is that, for soul to be the cause of motion and sensation of bodies, it 
cannot itself be a body,5 and this recognition of the incorporeality of the soul he again 
finds in the tradition. 
The Pythagoreans move in this direction by holding soul to be not the elements 
but their harmony.6 This account, however, still has body as the primary term 
(I.4.407b32-408a9),7 that is, the harmonious unification is a derivative and dependent 
incorporeality, whereas what is required is a cause (I.4.407b34-408al) : what is 
needed is a governing principle, that is, something which moves body, rather than 
something made (moved) by body. A rock, a lump of clay, or a random aggregate 
really does have body as the primary term, for the way the parts happen to be harmo-
nized is simply a function of the material, whereas an axe, for example, is an axe 
primarily because of its form, and the parts harmonized are really secondary. More 
significantly, living tissue or an organ does not "happen" following upon a coinci-
dence of material parts, but is, rather, what actively unites the parts over time.8 Fur-
ther, the organ does not hold together any material, but only a certain kind, that is, 
some other already harmonized unit, just as the axe presupposes an already unified 
aggregate of metal. Aristotle's point is that there are degrees of unification (as we 
shall see again with respect to knowing) and certain unities presuppose others. The 
higher unities presuppose the lesser unifications, and the harmony is not just the de-
rivative epiphenomenon of the bodily coincidence, but is the primary unity which 
4. I read ÔOKEÎ as "it seems to us" or "to men," not "it seems to me" ; hence "is reputed." 
5. See Metaphysics Z. 17.1041b 17-28 for this notion that the unifying relation of the parts cannot itself be just 
another part. 
6. I, 4 ; SORABJI, 1974, gives a compatible reading of this doctrine (n. 3 and passim). 
7. See also PLATO, Phaedo, 92a-94e where Socrates criticizes his Pythagorean interlocutors for offering a 
"harmony" account which makes the soul derivative ; in his treatment of what Anaxagoras should have 
said (97c-99c), he suggests an essentially Aristotelian relation between voûç and its "material conditions." 
8. See De Partibus Animalium, 1.1 passim. 
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actually selects which material is appropriate and determines how the material is held 
together. The incorporeal harmony is thus not a product of the body's coming to-
gether, but is the cause. This is what Anaxagoras recognizes in referring to mind as 
responsible for all things.9 
Aristotle's completes his study of the reputation of soul in Book II Chapter 2 
noting that soul is seen as what essentially distinguishes the living from the non-
living.10 We have thus found in the tradition all the elements of Aristotle's definition 
of soul in Book II Chapter 1. Aristotle gets from his heritage that soul must be an in-
corporeal cause of motion and awareness.11 It must be substance, since it governs ; 
and while being neither a body nor a derivative of body, it is related to body (namely, 
as the organizer which gives the body meaning). Finally, to account for the distinc-
tion living/non-living, ensouling must presuppose already a certain unification of 
multiplicity ; for not any body admits of being ensouled, but only those which are 
sufficiently developed to be able to perform the necessary functions which define 
life.12 Aristotle summarizes this relation of soul to body : 
And for this reason those have the right conception who believe that the soul does not exist 
without a body and yet is not itself a kind of body. For it is not a body, but something 
which belongs to a body, and for this reason exists in a body, and in a body of such-and-
such a kind. Not as our predecessors supposed, when they fitted it to a body without any 
further determination of what body and of what kind, although it is clear that one chance 
thing does not receive another. In our way it happens just as reason demands. For the actu-
ality of each thing comes naturally about in that which is already such potentially and in its 
appropriate matter. From all this it is clear that the soul is a kind of actuality and principle 
of that which has the potentiality to be such (II.2.414al9ff, trans. D.W. Hamlyn). 
Thus soul, then, is not a relation to any body, but to an organized body — a body ca-
pable of life (II. 1.412a27-b 1 ). From the tradition, then, we have the soul as incorpo-
real, and as the organizing principle of the living body. 
Aristotle's contribution to this account of soul is not a further trait, but is the 
principle or ground by which all the other characteristics are able to be organized into 
a single whole, and this contribution is precisely his looking at the totality in terms of 
potency and act, and this means looking at both the account of soul and the tradition 
which produced it in these terms. Yet this way of looking is itself already present in 
9. D-K 12 : voûç rules (Kpatel) "the whole rotation" as well as all things that have life, and voûç "arranged 
(ôiaKÔauriaE) all things." Aristotle adopts Kpaxeîv at III.4.429al9. 
10.1.4.408a24-29 and I.1.402a6-7 suggest the connection of soul with life is a commonplace which is reason-
able since in Homer yu/fi is "breath of life" : see Odyssey, XI, 218-222 and Iliad, V, 696-698 ; C. KAHN, 
"Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 48 
(1966), reprinted in BARNES et ai, 1975-1979, vol. IV, p. 1-31, discusses the intimate relation of \\f\>xA and 
life (p. 3-4). 
11. "Sensation" is given very broad scope by Aristotle in Book I ; on aïa0r|oiç as awareness in general, see 
KAHN, 1966, p. 22-25, and S. BENARDETE, "Aristotle, De Anima III.3-5," Review of Metaphysics, 28 
(1975): p. 611-622, p. 612. 
12. H'uxri, rather than ôpuri (Physics II. 1.192b 18, 14) applies when the body under consideration is a composite 
(II.1.412al3-16), that is, when it is not a simple element, but is organized, an organism. Only such a body 
can properly be said to live, for only such a body can die, that is, cease in its act of self-maintenance and 
decompose into simpler bodies. 
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the tradition in Platonic method ; once this is established, it will be clear that Aris-
totle's definition of soul is a unification of the multiple threads present in the tradi-
tion, produced by actualizing (that is, actively thinking in their inter-relation) the po-
tentialities present in the philosophical environment (ëÇiç) which constitute Aris-
totle's situation, both with respect to subject-matter and method (form). Let us con-
sider this "Platonic" method. 
Aristotle's method is primarily to look to see how the history is rational, that is, 
to see how the various characterizations of soul by his predecessors serve a common 
end ; it involves recognizing what it is that is achieved by his predecessors even if 
they do not recognize it themselves, and what it is that animates this success.13 This 
animator is the attempt to explain "movement" and "sensation" and when one sees 
this as what the tradition is trying to do, the tradition makes sense : the multiplicity of 
different philosophies is seen as united in a single project. This method, then, looks 
for unity on the expectation that the various accounts are successful, that is, there is 
truth to be found in them.14 Finally, the tradition is seen as in general a developing 
recognition which advances from potency to act, and from attributes to substance, 
moving from the attributes of movement and sensation through their incorporeal 
ground to the final recognition of the primacy of the act of the incorporeal uniting. 
Our question is whether this approach of trying to see unity in the apparent multiplic-
ity of the past is itself grounded in the principles of the tradition. Now, in general, 
this search for a unifying ground is indeed a guiding theme from Thaïes on (and 
much of Metaphysics A is precisely devoted to showing a similar development from 
potency to act in the history of the accounts of the one and the many). There is, how-
ever, a more precise connection with a method advocated in the Platonic dialogues ; 
this method could be called "theodicy" or "dialectic." 
In the Phaedo, Socrates advocates that method which, he says, is an account of 
how "mind is the cause of all things."15 He maintains that one shows mind to be the 
cause of all things when one shows how all things are for the best : things are shown 
to be as they should be, that is, rational. This method is again brought into play in the 
Timaeus where Timaeus' account is to show that the world is good.16 This is already 
Plato's development of the Anaxagorean tradition, and Aristotle continues in this tra~ 
dition in showing how the history of psychology has developed rationally to its pres-
ent state. A second strand of the Platonic method is found in the account of dialectic 
13. See the following for useful characterizations of aspects of this method : on predecessors, see Metaphysics, 
B.1.995a24-b4 ; De Caelo, I.10.279b6-13, II.13.294a6-13 ; on the <}>aiv6u£va, see Prior Analytics, 
I.30.46al8-22 ; De Caelo, I.3.270bl-6, II.13.293a2l-30, III.7.306alO-18 ; De Generatione et Corruption, 
1.2.316a5-14 ; Nicomachean Ethics, VI.8.1142al8-20, VII.1.1145b2-8 ; for a general statement, Eudemian 
Ethics, VII.2.1235M3-18. 
14. This is particularly evident in the consideration of the theories which maintain "like affects like" and those 
which maintain "unlike affects unlike," where the effort is to see in what sense both can be true insights 
(II.4.416a21 b9, and cf. De Generatione et Corruptione, I.7.323bl5-324a9) ; this reconciliation will be 
considered in Section 2, below. 
15.97c-d ; see especially "mind in producing order sets everything in order and arranges each individual thing 
in the way that is best for it" (trans. H. Tredennick) ; note also the connection of "mind" with what is "best" 
in Metaphysics, A.7, 9, 10. 
16. 29a. Plotinus II.9 is a Platonic attempt to work out what this means. 
782 
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRADITION IN ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY 
at the end of the analogy of the divided line in Republic VI, and as it is employed 
throughout the dialogues.17 In general, dialectic in Plato involves moving from as-
sumed starting points to more fundamental and rational grounds, and it proceeds 
through a dialogue in which accounts are offered, examined, found wanting, and re-
placed with new accounts. Again, Aristotle continues in the Platonic tradition in see-
ing the rational development in the history of psychology as such a process of dialec-
tic. 
Of course, Plato's theodical and dialectical method is not usually considered to 
be an historical method : rather, it is supposedly a method for performing atemporal 
metaphysics — a method for seeing the one in the many. In Aristotle, however, the 
method is applied to the tradition from which it emerges, and the historical multiplic-
ity of accounts is shown to be a developmental motion from potency to actuality of a 
unitary account. Thus Aristotle's historical method is a reconciling of stasis and flux 
over time, just as, in his De Anima, a single principle (\jn)XT|) is found to be stabiliz-
ing the flux of an individual's development over time. (There will be reason to recall 
this parallel when Aristotle's historical approach is tested to see if it accords with his 
explicit account of knowing.) 
In sum, then, all the basic elements of Aristotle's definition of soul are derived 
from his tradition. The method by which this derivation is performed is itself derived 
from the tradition, namely, from Plato. Thus in Aristotle's psychology one aspect of 
the tradition in which he exists is brought to bear on other aspects, and the result is 
his philosophy. In Aristotle's philosophy, then, that is, through Aristotle's activity of 
synthesis, the tradition in which Aristotle exists questions itself. In other words, in 
claiming to speak for the tradition, Aristotle is presenting his act as the conclusion of 
a practical syllogism for which Plato provides the subjective premise of desire, and 
the ÔoÇa provide the objective premise.18 In working out the significance of this 
claim, it will become clear that the result of this self-questioning of the tradition is 
that it becomes aware of itself as having been present all along. 
17. Republic, 511a-e and 533c ; see also the series of accounts of the slave in the Meno, about ëpcoç in the 
Symposium, of soul in the Phaedo, of the one in the Parmenides, of the collapse of states in Republic, VIII, 
and so on. I will not pursue whether the method Socrates actually employs in these dialogues properly ex-
emplifies dialectic as articulated in Republic. 
18. De Motu Animalium, 6.700b4-7.701b32. Action is a syllogism with an animating principle of desire pro-
viding the "major premise," that is, the general context within which experience can count as valuable, and 
some form of recognition providing the "minor premise," that is, the knowledge that certain specific con-
ditions are met which respond to the generic imperative of the major premise ; when an agent is really ani-
mated by a desire, and that agent recognizes that the conditions for satisfying that desire are met, the action 
of trying to fulfill the desire follows as a consequence, according to the regular pattern of a syllogism : "A 
syllogism is a logos in which, when certain things are posited, something other than those things laid down 
follows necessarily by virtue of the existence of these posited things" (Prior Analytics, I.1.24M8-20 ; 
Topics, I.1.100a25-27). The practical syllogism is the form of an activity that is rational without being 
aware of its rationality. 
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II. KNOWING : VV%T\ and Noûç 
My main contention is that Aristotle's approach to knowing history is the culmi-
nation, and the necessary culmination, of his approach to knowledge in general ; to 
establish this, Aristotle's theory of knowing must be investigated. I contend further 
that Aristotle's theory of knowing is itself the necessary culmination of his concep-
tion of the relation of soul and body. My argument, then, is that Aristotle's account of 
the relation of soul and body, when properly understood, entails a philosophy of his-
tory which is such as to justify Aristotle's way of knowing history. This section will 
be the real focus of my argument. I will be required to give an account of soul in gen-
eral and of voûç in particular in order to show why it is necessary to know history as 
that which has been leading up to oneself. I shall argue that cognition of the self as TO 
TI r\v elvai — the Aristotelian rejoinder to the Cartesian cogito19 — is the key to the 
Aristotelian psychology. Because Aristotle's philosophy sees itself as the i l r\v elvai 
of its tradition, we will have to consider the notion of self-cognition as the xi r\v elvai 
of a history ; to see this, we will need to understand voûç, and for this we will need to 
consider the build-up of cognition up to vo-ûç. 
Analyzing the Aristotelian epistemology will require explicating key sections of 
De Anima and integrating a portion of the Posterior Analytics with the De Anima in 
order to deal with the issues of mediation, self-cognition, and the identity of subject 
and object in knowing. I begin by arguing that the soul is the cause of awareness by 
being the principle of the act of unification with the object. 
1. Soul as unification and npôç ev equivocal 
All the functions of the soul (that is, soul as the second èvT8^é%eia, or, what the 
agent is in practice) are, I will show, essentially actions whereby the self and the 
other are in some manner identified. This basic principle derives from De Generati-
on et Corruptione, and we can trace it throughout Aristotle's account of the forms of 
ensouling to see that and how it applies ; we must see what kind of identification is 
involved, and how the form the identification takes differs with different kinds of 
soul. 
In De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.7, Aristotle discusses the two rival accounts 
of change, namely, that unlike affects unlike, and that like affects like. Now it seems 
that unlike must affect unlike, for, if there is a change, there must be a difference — 
an unlikeness — involved : for one thing to be affected by another, it literally must be 
19. My argument will be at odds with ROBINSON, 1978. Robinson takes his orientation towards the nature of 
knowledge and of self-consciousness from the assumptions of Early Modern epistemology, whereas I, (like 
SORABJI, 1974, p. 45-51, among others), propose that Aristotle offers material for a critique of these. Two 
crucial notions which, I would argue, differentiate Aristotle's position are (i) that self-cognition is an 
achievement which takes the form of the actualization of a potential {contra ROBINSON, p. 106-107) and 
which is only possible in and through cognition of the object, and (ii) that knowledge has the two-fold 
structure of being a totalizing and a unified, systematic interpreting of the multiple, determinate ëÇiç which 
forms the potential object of knowledge. This concept of knowing, I contend, is exemplified in the general 
logic of the ensouling of a living body, in all the various psychic activities and especially in the compre-
hensive act of vôrioiç which is equally the successful self-cognition. 
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an other which does the affecting, or else the first was not affected at all but simply 
remained on its own self-same course. Yet, on the other hand, it seems that only like 
can affect like, for in the absence of an identity of agent and patient there is no me-
dium within which contact is possible.20 Aristotle resolves this dilemma by arguing 
that each account is inadequate on its own, but that both accounts are right in differ-
ent senses : for there to be change, the change must take place within a unified con-
text — a self-same situation — but there must be differentiations within this whole, 
that is, agent and patient must be like in genus and unlike in species.21 All change, 
then, takes place within a common situation, but in a situation which is constituted by 
essentially differentiated members. Physical change is such change when it is self-
motivated, and psychic change is physical change in a composite body. Nutrition — 
the simple act of self-maintenance of the simplest composite physical body — is the 
most primitive psychic act and gives the most immediately apparent exemplification 
of this principle of change as the identification of like and unlike, of self and other, 
for, unlike the static harmony of Pythagoreanism, the unity of the nutritive subject 
only comes as a process of assimilating the object to the subject (II.4.416b3ff). 
The plant only exists as a relation to an environment : it is only this dynamic nu-
tritive relationship which "exists on its own," and which "has properties but is not it-
self a property," in that it is only in relation to this dynamic, self-moving whole that 
the various members are defined, while outside of this complete relation the members 
cannot survive and, indeed, reveal their intrinsic dependence on the other elements of 
the situation.22 For the plant, there is a necessary distinction between its self and its 
other, which is that upon which it feeds to maintain itself. Plant life is thus a relation 
of unlikes. Yet, equally, the relation is itself the very process of transformation of the 
unlike into the like, for it is thus that the plant-self is affected — is fed — and the re-
lation is thus equally that of like to like : it is assimilation as the transformation of 
unlike to like. Thus nutrition is the relation of the self to an other in which the other is 
transformed into the self. Thus, even in the lowest ensouling, maintenance of self re-
quires identification with the other. 
Nutrition is one form of enacting the identification of self and other, but it is the 
most primitive form, for the identification is such that the other as such is destroyed. 
The sameness of genus in this change amounts to the participation of both subject 
and object in the nutritive relation, and the difference of species is precisely the dif-
ference of eating subject and eaten object. The activity of eating actualizes the iden-
tity of genus, that is, it makes the one member of the relation a nutritive self, and it 
makes the other member a nutritive other, but the very activity of actualizing the 
identity is a relation of this self to its other in which the otherness of the other is 
20.I.7.323M-15. 
21.1.7.323bl5-324a9, especially 323b29-33. 
22. See Categories, 5.3a8-9 ; Metaphysics, A.8.1017b23-26, for definitions of owjicc in these terms, and Phys-
ics, II. 1.192b 13-16 for the definition of a physical substance as a self-mover ; the notion that members only 
exist in the context of the whole and are thus dependent on the other members is the point of Aristotle's 
discussion in De Partibus Animalium, I.1.640b34-641a7 and Metaphysics, Z.16.1040b5-16 ; cf. Politics, 
I.2.1253a20-27. 
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overcome, and the completed work of the relation, its évépyeia, is the transformation 
of the other into the self. It is in this relation to otherness that we find what might 
most truly be called solipsism, for the nutritive self is the self which encounters only 
itself when it encounters its other, and does this in a way which undermines any in-
dependence to that other ; we shall see that all psychic relations are some form of self 
encounter — in experiencing the other, the experience of the self is a by-product, a 
7cdpepyov — but it is only in this nutritive solipsism that the independence of the 
otherness of the other is completely effaced. We will now go on to see that this 
"identification with the other" which defines 'V^Xn." is a npoq ëv equivocal such that 
ensoulings will become progressively higher in proportion as they are identifications 
which involve progressively less destruction of one contrary, with voûç being the fi-
nal term of the series in relation to which the lesser forms are defined.23 
Whereas in nutrition the other is destroyed in favor of the self, in sensation this 
situation is approximately reversed ; in sensation, the sensing must conform to the 
object, for the sense is supposed to become identical with the object without intru-
sion. In the case of nutrition, the object provided the fuel for the self-maintenance of 
the nutritive agent ; in sensation, it is the fulfillment of the object which defines the 
completion of the relation, and it is the sentient subject which plays the role of fuel : 
[...] the power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself 
spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition (II.5.417a7-
8, trans. J.A. Smith). 
Thus, in sensing, it is the sentient animal which makes itself available for the com-
pletion of the object. In this relation of burning up fuel, however, the destruction of 
one contrary is not as severe as the fueling of nutrition, for the member of the rela-
tionship which functions as fuel — the psychic power of sensing — does not lose its 
very being. Although aïo9r|oiç conforms to the aioGrrra for the duration of the 
sensing, it still retains its capacity to sense, and to maintain a "mean," (see 
II.12.424a32-b3). It is only when the sense conforms too thoroughly to the object that 
it is destroyed, either temporarily or completely, as happens when the aiaGnia are 
too intense, (II.12.424a28-31). The metaphysics of aïo0r|oiç is too complex to ar-
ticulate here, but we can at least see at a formal level that there is here an identifica-
tion (III.2.425b25-27), and it is primarily of subject to object inasmuch as sensation is 
the reception of the form of the other, (II.12.424al7-19).24 
23. It is because \\f\)%T] exhibits rcpôç ëv equivocity that Aristotle remarks that it is not sufficient to give a sim-
ple formulaic definition of soul but that one must instead see how VJTUXTI manifests itself concretely 
(II.3.414b20-415al3). For homonymous predication npoq ëv, see Metaphysics, T.2 ; R.G. COLLINGWOOD, 
The Idea of Nature (Oxford, 1960), p. 80, glosses this notion as "of [...] various meanings one is the deep-
est and truest meaning ; the others are approximations to it arising from varying degrees of failure to grasp 
this deepest meaning." 
24. For the basic account of sense, see III.2, II.5 and 11.12 ; see also III.8.43 lb22-23 for the identity of ala-
Qr\aiq and aiaQr\xâ. For the notion of alaQr\oiq as the reception of form without matter, compare the inter-
pretations of T. SLAKEY, "Aristotle on Sense Perception," Philosophical Review, 1961 : p. 470-484, who 
argues for a strongly materialist reading of Aristotle's account of sensation ; and F. BRENTANO, Die Psy-
chologie des Aristoteles (Mainz, 1867), p. 79-81, who argues for a strongly immaterialist reading of Aris-
totle's account ; KAHN, 1966 (p. 1-2) and offers a detailed treatment of the need for an Aristotelian account 
of sensation to integrate both the material and immaterial sides thus showing each of these separate options 
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We can therefore see that, both in the case of nutrition and in the case of sensa-
tion, the soul is the principle according to which an act of unification of the subject 
with its relevant other is effected. These two different psychic operations differ fun-
damentally in the form in which they achieve this unification, however, for the one 
act (nutrition) is a material transformation in which the very integrity — the form — 
of one member is destroyed and replaced by that of its contrary, while the other act 
(sensation) presupposes material relations, but is itself defined by a formal relation in 
which the identification with the form of the one contrary is precisely the preserva-
tion of the form of the other contrary, that is, it is the preservation of its characteristic 
of receptivity, (see II.5.417b2-5). We can complete our account of nutrition and sen-
sation by seeing how each is an experience of self èv 7capépy(p. At that point we can 
understand how the noetic relation is the most perfect fulfillment of that relation of 
which nutrition and sensation are inferior species. 
In both nutrition and sensation, it is the psychic subject who provides the context 
within which the other can count as meaningful, as an other. In nutrition, the subject 
really does have an other, but it never really gets that other, for its very act of getting 
is the act of destroying that other as other ; nutrition forces its other to answer to its 
(nutrition's) demands, and the relation is entirely conducted on the terms set by the 
nutritively self-maintaining self. Nutrition, which provides the genus for the relation 
of both self and food, is defined by that species which is the nutritive self (not the 
nutritive other), since the very concept of nutrition is the ^ //-maintenance of the nu-
tritive subject in relation to its object, and thus in nutrition the self provides the terms 
of the whole relation, and the experience of the other is thus in terms of the self : as 
that which provides the context within which the other is meaningful, the nutritive 
subject is always implicitly dealing with itself in dealing with its other. Yet it remains 
true that, as in all psychic operations, the nutritive relation is directed outwards, to-
ward an other ; thus its direct object is not itself but the other, and it is thus indirectly, 
or év 7iapépyci), that it relates to itself in relating to its other. Indeed, in nutrition 
"experience of anything is not the goal at all, but substantial self-maintenance is, so 
any discussion of the discrimination of objects and the "assertion" or "experience" of 
self is something we can notice going on in the plant, but not something open to it. 
And even though the self (as what is to be maintained) is the ultimate goal of the 
whole activity, the direct object remains the food, so, again, this solipsistic experi-
ence of self is only an incidental attribute which necessarily accompanies the nutri-
tive relationship and does not define it. Something analogous to this incidental self-
perception is true of sensation. 
Just as nutrition is the act of making the other answer the question "how can you 
support my life," sensation also experiences the other, not through a complete aban-
donment to the other's own terms, but in terms set by the sensing subject. But 
whereas nutrition went so far as to make itself the very substance of the other, sensa-
to be unacceptable ; I am not entirely in agreement with Kahn, partly because of his treatment of the rela-
tion between sensation and intellection, but I endorse his general strategy, especially with respect to the 
doctrine of the unity of the sensitive soul. 
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tion tolerates the independence of the other, and the self-imposition which sensation 
effects on its other is limited to its only allowing the other to appear through limited 
dimensions, and not letting the other appear in its substantiality (which latter will be 
the form intellection takes). If we consider the various sense powers separately, we 
can see that each sense dimension — touch, taste, smell, and so on — provides the 
context which supplies the sameness of genus within which the species "self and 
"object" can come into relation ; thus touch demands, for example, that the object 
appear tactually, even though within this tactile context it is the other's form, the 
other's tangibility, which gives the relation content, that is, even though within the 
genus of the relation which is provided by the sensing subject, it is the species 
"other" which dominates over the species "self." In each case, the other which is ex-
perienced is the other defined by the self, and, thus, the self is indirectly experiencing 
itself as the genus, as that in terms of which the other is defined. To this extent, then, 
sensation is always self-sensation. A comparable point could be made by considering 
the sense-faculty as a whole, rather than by focusing on the special senses.25 
But in sensation the experience of self is not the goal : it is something which 
happens on the side. Indeed this tacit self-sensing only follows upon the achievement 
of the real goal of assuming the form of the other, for "self-ignition" does not happen 
in sensation, that is, it is the activity on the part of the object which directs the trans-
formations in the sense realm (II.5.417a2-9). Now, like nutrition, the activity of sen-
sation is indeed a ^//-actualization, and, unlike nutrition, for sensation "experience 
o f something really is the goal, but here again the fact that sensation ultimately takes 
the form of self-experiencing is only incidental to its definitive activity which is 
identification with the form of the object. So, once again, this psychic operation is an 
identification of subject and object, and it is one characterized by an experience of 
self, but an experience of self which happens, so to speak, on the side. We can turn 
now turn to vovq to see how it too is a form of identification of self and object ; in the 
case of voûç, however, the experience of self is not incidental. 
At a formal level these analyses reveal degrees of unification with the object, and 
the soul, as the principle of these functions is in each case a potential for unity with 
the world. In what follows we shall seek to understand how it is that that degree of 
unification which is self-cognizing voûç, by being a unity which respects the integrity 
of both subject and object, is the real standard of knowledge compared to which the 
other unifications are called knowledge. In intellection, a unity is effected from which 
the two moments of "subject" and "object" can be abstracted, but, insofar as voûç 
only is in its activity of being one with its object, the unity is the truth (III.7.43lbl6-
17 ; III.4.429a22-24 ; see III.7.431a3-4). Here again, then, we shall have a unity of 
subject with object, but in this case the identity of agent and object makes it impossi-
25. See III.2.426bl7-427al4. The common act of sensing is considered in On Sense and Sensibilia, 7.448M7-
449a20, esp. 449a5-10, and On Sleep, 2.455a3-27. KAHN, 1966, addresses issues relevant to this doctrine ; 
see also BENARDETE, 1975, p. 619-620. It seems to me that J. BARNES, "An Aristotelian Way with Scepti-
cism," in M. MATTHEN, éd., Aristotle Today (Academic Printing and Publishing, 1986), p. 51-76, fails to 
understand that the animal is the subject of sense, and that Aristotle's story is not of the gradual build-up of 
apparent unities from discrete data of discrete senses ; his privileging of aïoBriaiç over v6-n.au; as the 
"criterion" of knowledge (p. 54) also fails to do justice to Aristotle's position. 
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ble to consider the experience of self as something incidental to the relation. We shall 
see that the proper form of vôrioiç is self-cognition. To understand what this means 
requires that we first work through the issues of mediation and self-cognition by way 
of the Posterior Analytics.26 
2. Habituation and Mediation 
Posterior Analytics 11.19 describes the development of awareness from (rela-
tively) immediate sensation to universal comprehension. Our immediate awareness 
makes information available to us, and our ability to remember significant unities 
within experience allows us to develop skills for coping with our environment ; fi-
nally, our participation in intellect allows us to move from being simply "experi-
enced" in dealing with some affairs to coming to understand why our approach has 
been successful and becoming scientists thereby : voûç allows us to move from being 
experienced to being conscious of the first principles according to which our experi-
ence is organized. This last step is crucial, and can be illustrated if we consider, for 
example, carpentry (even if this is not technically a "science" according to Aristo-
tle).27 
Someone who has never become experienced in carpentry can never be a scien-
tist of carpentry, can never comprehend it, for, even if this would-be knower read all 
the relevant books, the principles would not be rooted in m (|)cavôu.eva, that is, they 
would be abstract principles which literally explain nothing. On the other hand, 
someone else might very well have learned from a carpenter how to do carpentry 
work. This second candidate would be someone who knows the various techniques 
and knows that "in this case do x," and "in this case do y" ; this second candidate is 
"experienced," and has developed all the right habits of behavior. While this second 
candidate has the involvement in the things themselves which the first candidate 
lacks, this second candidate does not yet have the science of carpentry, for he or she 
26. An excellent account of Aristotle's program in the Posterior Analytics is given in L.A. KOSMAN, 
"Understanding, Explanation, and Insight in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics," in Exegesis and Argument 
(Assen, 1973), p. 374-392 ; I take my account of Aristotle's epistemology to accord with this. It seems to 
me that Barnes, 1969, gives the sort of mathematized view of àrcôôeiÇiç which Kosman rightly rejects. 
While I dispute some points made by M. BURNYEAT, "Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge," in E. 
BERTI, éd., Aristotle on Science. The Posterior Analytics (Antenore, 1981), p. 97-139, primarily regarding 
what "we" consider true (although his contrast of Aristotle's view with "ours" on p. 132-133 is a good ac-
count of Aristotle), I agree with the general interpretation ; Section V is especially valuable for under-
standing Aristotle's conception of knowledge. C. KAHN, "The Role of Nous in the Cognition of First Prin-
ciples in Posterior Analytics, II 19," in BERTI, 1981, p. 385-414, tries to unite the discussion in De Anima 
with that in An Post, 11.19, especially on p. 406 ff. ; I endorse his view that Aristotle's epistemology de-
pends on a more active intellectual role than Lockean empiricism, such that sensibility is the necessary but 
not the sufficient condition to knowledge ; rather than seeing voûç as self-reflection, however, his account 
pivots on the (Averroistic) argument that the active intellect is an independently existing thinking of all 
thoughts which exerts a strictly one-way causal influence on our thinking, (see especially p. 411-412 and 
his conclusion that "the Agent Intellect is in no sense part of us"), in relation to which, see AQUlNAS's cri-
tique of the Averroists, ST, 1.76.1 resp, 1.76.2 resp, 1.79.5, cf. KAHN, p. 412, n. 28. I sympathize with much 
of his account, especially the notion of building up a cognitive ëÇiç in order to participate in voûç, but I 
think he ultimately has too abstract a notion of noetic form, and a misinterpretation of Aristotle's notion of 
the primacy of act in relation to the moving cause. 
27. See Nicomachean Ethics, VI.3-4, 6 for the distinction between èmavt\iir\, xé^vn and voûç. 
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does not have his or her experience consciously organized according to the relevant 
principles. One is fully a carpenter upon coming to see why one acts in one way in 
one situation and in another way in another situation.28 Indeed, the carpenter proper 
may very well not behave in the fashion that the experienced apprentice would, for 
an understanding of a given situation may reveal that the usual way of behaving is 
inappropriate. It is only once the experienced practitioner has made the transition to 
science, to the understanding of the practice from the point of view of its first princi-
ples, that he or she is now capable of teaching, for up to this point he or she would 
only have passed on the recommendation to others that they develop the same good 
habits that they themselves had developed, without having any knowledge of why 
these habits are right, or, indeed, any proof that they really are right.29 Notice, too, 
that it is not simply given that anyone, regardless of situation, can become a carpentry 
scientist, nor even is it given that anyone who is "experienced" can make the transi-
tion to scientist in the relevant field. Even though the proper locution when one of us 
becomes a scientist is "now / understand what I was doing," the power to come to 
this self-understanding is not automatically in our possession ; I, for example, use my 
ability to try to understand Aristotle's text, and it, as it were, does its best to be un-
derstood, but there is no guarantee that the synthesis of my experience of reading into 
an identification with the first principles which organize the text will happen, and, 
even though I would later take responsibility for effecting the comprehension if it 
should happen, it is not simply up to me whether the transition to the self-conscious 
self-unification of my experience occurs. Let us consider this in terms our previous 
analysis of the soul. 
The movement here described is through progressively more perfect forms of 
knowing, from simple awareness to practical familiarity to understanding, and there 
are two sides to this developing knowing : on the one hand, the process is the devel-
opment of the constitution of the knowing subject, that is, at each stage the subject's 
education lays the necessary groundwork for the advance to the subsequent stage, 
but, equally, because, as we have seen, psychic functions are characterized by an 
identity of the subject and the object, it is a correlative progress in the object of 
awareness, for we become progressively better able to grasp the reasons responsible 
for our experience having taking the form it has all along. Now since it is also a prog-
ress in "truth," it follows that at the higher stages of its development the known ob-
ject is "more really" the object than that known at the lower stages, and, similarly, the 
development of the subject's contribution to knowledge is a development to the 
proper subjective conditions to let the object be apprehended in its truth. 
28. Compare the excellent account of oi npâxov ua66vTeç in BURNYEAT, 1981, p. 129-132. See also KOSMAN, 
1973, p. 386, concerning the various routes to voûç. 
29. My telling the story of Posterior Analytics, 11.19 in terms of xexvn., eurceipicx, and teaching parallel Meta-
physics, A.l (on which, see n. 36, below) ; for teaching, compare III.4.429b5-9. For comparable relations 
between teaching, habituation and cognition of first principles in regard to living well in human society see 
Nicomachean Ethics, II. 1-4. On the issue of habits which are based on a rule of thumb vs. first principles, 
see S. BENARDETE, "On Wisdom and Philosophy : the First Two Chapters of Aristotle's Metaphysics A," 
Review of Metaphysics, 32 (1978) : p. 205-215, p. 207. 
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Regarding this knowing subject, the development is a development of capacity. 
From the beginning, "all men by nature desire knowledge," that is to say, one is pro-
voked by one's very nature to be provoked by the object — one is provoked to look, 
to take up a questioning attitude toward one's situation ; the initial subjective capac-
ity, then, is an openness to what is.30 This capacity which provides simple presence to 
the object, however, is not sufficient to truly receive it : indeed, we have already 
characterized the presentation of sensation as a reception of the object in which the 
subject's form of receptivity sets limiting terms, so the subject will have to be prop-
erly developed if it is to receive the object in its oùcia. This development of the 
subjective constitution comes through the interacting of the original innate openness 
with what is presented, and it is through the interaction that the subject learns how to 
properly appreciate the object.31 
"Subjective conditions," however, are often construed as limitations interfering 
with the reception of the object which can only give us "things as they appear" and 
not "things as they are in themselves" ; indeed, Aristotle seems to say as much : 
[...] it is necessary then that mind, since it thinks all things, should be uncontaminated, as 
Anaxagoras says, in order that it may be in control (Kpcrrfl), that is, that it may know ; for 
the intrusion of anything foreign hinders and obstructs it. Hence the mind, too, can have no 
characteristic except its capacity to receive (III.4.429a 18-22, trans. W.S. Hett). 
Now we will have reason later to question this translation, but it serves to make the 
point that anything interposed between the pure object and the pure subject — the 
"intrusion of anything foreign" — appears to preclude the possibility of knowing. 
For the Aristotelian epistemology, however, sins of omission are as serious as 
sins of commission, and, indeed, the failure to develop sufficient capacity for com-
prehension is more truly limitation than developing an imperfect receptivity, for an 
absence of perspective is precisely the impossibility of knowledge. To set the ideal of 
knowledge as knowing the object as it exists independently of its being known is pre-
cisely to set the ideal of knowledge as the necessarily unknowable, and to make the 
project of knowing implicitly self-contradictory, with scepticism the only legitimate 
stance. But this is not Aristotle's approach. In the passage above, Aristotle refers to 
knowing as a "commanding," (Kpcrcfi) : the subjective capacity that needs to be de-
veloped is the capacity to rule the object, the capacity for comprehension, for seeing 
each and all in their totality and interrelatedness, for thoroughgoing identification 
with the object in its integrity. The real object of knowing will not be the immediate 
object, but the most fully mediated object, the object situated in its proper context.32 
30. Metaphysics, A.1.980a21, and see Posterior Analytics, II.19.99b35 : ëxei yàp o-6vap.iv <XÛU.<}>\)TOV KpixiKTiv, 
Tiv KaX.o\)aiv a'iaGnciv. I take this fundamental stance of questioning to be the crux of Aristotle's account ; 
I shall argue for an identification of this original act of wondering, of looking for sense, with the voûç noi-
rruKÔç. See AQUINAS, ST, I-II.94.2, resp. for an interpretation of these texts which sees being as such as the 
first object of awareness ; compare BENARDETE, 1975, p. 618. 
31. Posterior Analytics, II.19.99b35-100al4. Note the claim (100al3-14) that ènayarfr] is possible because 
soul is so constituted as to be able to engage in this experience. 
32. Not just the fact, but the fact situated in its rational context ; see, for example, Posterior Analytics, 11.2 pas-
sim, especially 89b37-90al, 90a5-7 and 90al5 ; 1.30 passim; I.33.88b30 ff. ; and Metaphysics, 
A.1.981a24-981b6. KOSMAN, 1973, p. 376, 379 gives an excellent treatment of the notion of cause and of 
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Without an ability to recognize an organic body, for example, it is not possible to 
recognize a hand as a hand. That which one would see without the concept of body 
would indeed have its "universal" — its truth — as a potential within it, for it is pre-
cisely this material which can come to be seen as a hand, but transforming this inade-
quate perception into the proper recognition of this object as a hand requires, first, 
seeing it in the context of all the other body parts, and, second, recognizing them as 
an interrelated totality ; one must first assemble the relevant multiplicity and then 
unify this multiplicity as an organic whole. Aristotle thus describes the development 
of the more sophisticated psychic situations : 
[...] they arise from sense-perception, just as, when a retreat has occurred in battle, if one 
man halts so does another, and then another, until the original position (àpxiî) has been re-
stored. [...] As soon as one individual percept has "come to a halt" in the soul, this is the 
first beginning of the presence there of a universal {Posterior Analytics, II. 19.100a 11-13, 
15-16, trans. H. Tredennick). 
The object, then, sets up its own terms of completeness, and it is only through devel-
oping the ability to organize — to mediate — one's own experience of the object ac-
cording to the principle which organizes the thing itself that the truth of the object 
can be recognized. In the quotation from De Anima, III.4, however, "mediation," as 
the interposing of a separate entity between knower and known, precluded the com-
mand of the object. What is required, then, is a different account of mediation ; if 
mediation is to be compatible with knowledge, mediation must not be the interposing 
of some third thing between knower and known. This apparent problem is resolved 
by understanding mediation as the development of a unified situation within which 
knower and known can relate. This is habituation. 
On Aristotle's account, knowing does not appear in a vacuum, but presupposes a 
knowable object (III.8.432a4-5, 7-9). Actual intellect is not created ex nihilo, but ex 
potentia, for thought presupposes an actual existence which is a potential object of 
thought, and this is equally true for the lesser grades of knowing ; this is the key to 
Aristotle's account of habituation and (what I call) the "active empiricism" of 
è7iaycoyri, "induction."33 For each progressive step in Posterior Analytics, 11.19, there 
is presupposed the creation of just such a situation which is potentially the next, that 
is, which can be unified in such a way as to create a new situation. In animals — 
sentient beings — ensouled so as to be able to retain sense information, repeated 
sensings give rise to memory ; repeated memories give rise to experience ; repeated 
experiences can be organized into a scientific comprehension.34 As we have seen in 
our examples above, and in each case in this overall story, the logic of the relation is 
the same : a multiplicity of lesser acts of awareness must be achieved in order that the 
TO u.éôov. That Aristotle's view in general is that it is the condition of the subject which must be developed 
in order to comprehend the truth is evident in his typical marking of the need to move from what is imme-
diately clearest according to us to what is clearest according to the thing itself. 
33. See the discussion by KAHN, 1981, p. 406-407. 
34. See 99b35-100a4, 100a4-6, 100a6-9. Concerning these "eidetic" ëÇeiç as psychic identifications, and si-
multaneous actualizations, of subject and object, note the definition of ëÇiç as "an actuality of the haver 
and of the had," {Metaphysics, A.20.1022b4-5). 
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higher level can be established through the unification of this multiplicity. The key to 
our awareness is precisely this ability to have our object provoke us to ask, "what are 
you ?" that is, it is precisely our activity of looking for rational unity within the de-
terminate multiplicity of our experience which is the key to our being able to develop 
our cognitive relation to things.35 It is thus through the interaction of the capacity for 
awareness and its use that the more sophisticated comprehension of the object devel-
ops : 
Thus these faculties (ëÇeiç) are neither innate as determinate and fully developed 
(à(j>cDpianévai), nor derived from other developed faculties (ëÇecov) on a higher plane of 
knowledge; they arise from sense-perception, (Post An, II.19.100alO-ll, trans. H. Tre-
dennick, my emphasis). 
I have called this a progress of habituation insofar as each step requires that the pre-
vious step be "possessed," that is, it must become a ë£iç, a "habit." Our act of look-
ing for unity is what makes an object available to us, and this "possessing" lays the 
basis for a new relation, namely, our focus of the question of unity onto the achieved 
situation — the ëÇiç — itself. This habituation is thus progressive, and it is a progres-
sive synthesis, that is, it is a comprehension of what came before as an organized to-
tality and not an abstraction which would find its truth precisely in its independence 
from particular circumstances.36 
The progress, then, is a transformation in which some ëÇiç — which is a certain 
psychic relation of individual to world and, therefore, an identification — is, when 
construed in terms of the subject, a certain 0-uvau.ic for performing a "higher" know-
ing, and is, when construed in terms of the object, a certain ôt>vauiç for being known 
in a higher way.37 The subject-in-situation (that is, already in relation to an object) is 
a certain capacity for "looking" which is a more developed capacity than that which 
produced the already existent relation to the object. What this subject "looks at" is 
this situation, this world to which it is related. At each point, the subject is related to a 
world that has been disclosed to it in terms of the way the subject is concerned about 
it, that is, in terms of those questions it asks within the context of which the object 
can appear and to which it must conform. "Mediating subjective conditions," then, 
does not have to mean some third entity interposed between subject and object ; 
rather, it means the development of sufficient sophistication within a would-be cog-
nizer for it to be able to recognize the form of the object when it encounters it, and 
35. Cf. BENARDETE, 1975, p. 612-614 on the power of <t»avxaaia. 
36. The parallel account of the progress of knowledge in Metaphysics, A.l attests to the "collective" character 
of the development through its comparison of xé%VT| with éuTteipiâ. The TÉxvn. which is not joined with 
experience is inferior to experience taken by itself, yet TÉXVTI is higher than experience in the man who pos-
sesses both (981al2-15, 24-30). Similarly, in all the cases Aristotle here considers, xéxvri is in each case 
superior to eujieipid because it can supply the "reasoned fact" ; but it is because it stands on the basis of 
experience, that is, because it has "commanded" the experience which provides its basic situation, that it is 
superior (981a3-7, 24-30). On this issue of comprehension versus abstraction, KAHN, 1981, p. 409-410 
rightly objects to the attribution of a epistemological theory of abstraction to Aristotle, if abstraction is 
conceived either on the model of mathematical or empiricistic abstraction ; see p. 409, n. 24. BENARDETE, 
1978, offers a stimulating reading of Metaphysics, A. 1-2. 
37. At De Anuria, III.3.428a3-5, it is implied that each of aiaGrjoic, ôôÇa, £7UCTT|U.TI, and voûç is "5-ûvau.iç KCÙ 
ËÇIÇ." 
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the development of this sophistication is also the process of bringing to unity — 
bringing into actual being — its proper object. 
We now have an understanding of the identification of subject and object in psy-
chic activity and of the role of mediating subjective conditions as these appear in the 
lesser forms of soul and of knowing. At this point we have ourselves developed a suf-
ficient ëÇiç to allow us to unify these analyses into an understanding of the nature of 
voûç. 
3. Novç as self-reflection 
According to our analysis of the grades of knowing studied in Posterior Analyt-
ics, 11.19, in the act of knowing the intelligent-situated-subject thinks about its intelli-
gible situation ; its object is itself, or, rather, its object is whatever-it-was-before now 
transformed from multiple-immediate-situation to unified-object-for-knowledge. For 
knowing, then, its subject-matter is always given to it already. The knowing agent is 
already an-object-in-relation-to-the-subject and it is thinking about itself insofar as its 
given object is that which has been revealed according to the capacities of the subject 
and reflects the kinds of questions the subject asked it. This is the ultimate signifi-
cance of the notion of self-perception èv Ttapépyco discussed above, namely, that the 
knowing soul investigates the (j)cavop.£va in which it is already involved : it reflects 
on the relation to the world which it already is. These (|)aivôu.£va, however, are not 
received as objects of intellection in the same form in which they constituted the 
ëÇiç, but are rather transformed in being known into a new unity. 
In actual knowing, knower and known are one (III.7.431al-2, III.5.430al9-20). 
No-ûç only is in its acting (III.4.429al7-19, III.5.430al8), and it is its content, so de-
terminate knowing only is the determinate known. It is not, however, just the multi-
plicity of known content, but is, rather, this content as unified in the active synthe-
sizing of it into an-object-for-cognition.38 Further, within this act of concrete total-
izing knowing there are two sides which can be recognized. There is, first, the 
"passive voûç" which is the determinate content of the new comprehended totality, 
and, second, there is the "active voûç" which is the energizmg of this content into a 
single unity : it is the comprehend/fig itself. These are not "two intellects," but two 
logically separable features within a single active relating of self to self.39 We must 
now consider this relation between the activity and passivity of voûç — that which 
38. Noûç functions as "unifier" at III.6.430b5-6. 
39. J. OWENS, "The Self in Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics, 41 (1988) : p. 713-722, p. 717, gives distinct 
"features" rather than HETT'S "elements" for ôia<j>opdç in De Anima, III.5.430al3-14. The treatment of ac-
tive and passive intellect in KAHN, 1981, especially p. 406 - 407, seems to me to treat these two both as 
fully separate faculties (p. 406), and as only logically distinct moments in a single relation (p. 407) ; I am 
much more sympathetic to his account when he distinguishes these two only as "the active-passive contrast 
between thinking subject and objects thought," (p. 407), though our different approaches to epistemology 
might lead Kahn to mean something more dualistic than I would. D. MODRAK, "The Nous-Body Problem 
in Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics, 44 (1991) :755-774, p. 764-767, has interesting proposals for how to 
understand active voûç. 
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only is in its act of being its own object — as a self-reflection, from which point it 
will be possible to go back and make sense of the path we have so far traveled.40 
In self-reflection, the reflecting agent is nothing more than the determinate total-
ity of his or her psychic relations (unifications) with the world in the sense of not be-
ing another piece added on ; from the point of view of content, then, the agent and 
the object of self-reflection are (by definition) the same individual. Yet this reflection 
involves a process of self-withdrawal from out of the determinate content which "is" 
the self : "I" can always view my "self," and "I," that is, the reflectmg one, am not 
"that," (the one reflected on), for precisely what I have done in reflecting is differen-
tiate (this) myself from (that) myself. The "I" is the active power of withdrawing 
from "my" determinations, of becoming "not-them," of becoming related to myself 
as not-being that self. In this sense, then, self-reflection is the self being related to it-
self as not-being itself : the two sides are the same, but the self relates to itself by tac-
itly asserting that that (me) is not me (this me). The self is related to itself as to an 
other, for, qua subject, it is precisely not the object. In other words, the individual 
who supplies both terms of the reflective relation is a unity — a single self — only as 
a splitting into a duality of viewer and viewed : of the passive self-as-totalized and of 
active self-as-self-totalizing. This is a crucial point and must be understood. 
Before being viewed (reflected upon), "I" was only a potential unity, and it is 
only in retrospect from the point of view of actual reflection — from the point of 
saying "I" — that I realize that I was already one and the same individual me ; thus to 
say "cogito" is to identify the "I" as TO TI f^ v elvcti, that is, "I" am who I always al-
ready was,41 but (contra Descartes) until this act of actualizing recognition, the iden-
tity — my identity — was only potential, as I was really a multiplicity of determinate 
involvements open to organized unification, but not yet unified. The "I" — the self-
conscious self as an actual unity — only emerges in the act by which it separates it-
self from itself as viewer and viewed, and it is only when its content is for the "I" that 
it is explicitly — actually — unified. My reality as "me" is that I am that for which 
myself as object (the totality of my intrinsic otherness) has been waiting, and I 
achieve my status of selfhood precisely when I recognize my otherness as what has 
been waiting for me to recognize it as myself ; indeed it becomes an "it," a unity, 
precisely in the act by which I become a unity by recognizing myself as that for 
which it exists, as the xéXoq. The act of self-cognition thus brings the unity of noetic 
40. Gregory NAGY has defended the interpretation of voûç as self-consciousness in "Homer and Oral Poetics," 
presented at St. John's College, Annapolis, October 1991 ; compare D. FRAME, The Myth of Return in 
Early Greek Epic (Yale, 1975). OWENS, 1988, p. 713-722, gives a provocative account of an Aristotelian 
dynamics of self-consciousness. His account of self-cognizance èv 7iapépY(p (p. 711-713, glossing Meta-
physics, A.9.1074b35-36) accords with my analysis ; see especially p. 713,11. 25-34. His discussion of the 
applicability of the concept of a "true self to Aristotle (p. 714 ff.) parallels my themes. 
41. J. OWENS, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd edition (Pontifical Institute of Me-
dieval Studies, 1978), p. 180-188, studies this Aristotelian phrase and takes the r\\ as an imperfect func-
tioning as a gnomic aorist. Brad INWOOD has suggested this fiv is the kind of "was" that we use in saying 
"so that's what it was" after we suddenly intuit the conclusion from a string of premises ; I accept this ac-
count but modified to realizing "so that's what I was doing" as in my carpentry example. On transforming 
all the proper premises into a syllogistic understanding in the context of cognition, see BURNYEAT, 1981, 
p. 129-132. 
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selfhood — its own unity — into being, and the unity achieved is itself only a unity 
as an act of self-differentiating, only as an act of instituting a subject for which there 
is an object. Thus what "I am" only becomes "me" in the very move by which "I" 
distance myself from this "myself which I have just recognized as myself — this 
"myself which "I" have made. This, I contend, is the notion of making (rcoiev) with 
which Aristotle deals when he considers vo-uç as TIOITVUKOC : the vovç makes for itself 
an intelligible world and recognizes this world as itself. It is this power to say "I" — 
the power to recognize oneself as a subject with the implications here articulated — 
which is voûç 7toirvuKÔç (which ultimately characterizes the highest power in the 
Aristotelian universe).42 
Unlike Descartes, then, the Aristotelian self does not say "cogito" from the point 
of view of the absolute abstraction of universal doubt ; rather, in order to be uttered, it 
must be the last thing one says, and to say it presupposes an entire history of devel-
opment of the psyche ; the intellect may seem to be a separate power which self-
exists and enters on the scene in utter independence as in Descartes, just as the theory 
which the carpenter ultimately understands appears as self-contained and independ-
ently understandable, but for Aristotle this is not the reality, and whatever independ-
ence and separability the active voûç has, (namely, the separability from unreconciled 
otherness),43 it will have to be rooted in a comprehending of its conditions, rather 
than abstraction from them, for precisely what self-cognition amounts to is the reali-
zation that "I" only exist as the recognition and unification of my otherness, of my-
self as other. Now, finally, the implications of this account of the self-consciousness 
and self-knowledge ofvoûç for the doctrine of knowledge in general can be summa-
rized, from which point Aristotle's historical method can be appraised. 
4. The unity of the doctrine of soul 
Since, as we have seen, knower and known are one in knowing, all knowing 
must be self-reflection : this is not unique to vo-ûç. At each psychic level of knowing, 
the awareness is in some way a self-awareness. This is because, as argued above, at 
each point the subject is aware of the object-evaluated-in-terms-of-the-psychic-
attitude. The subject, therefore, structures its own knowledge : in each case the sub-
ject (the soul) provides the ground of unity by asking the unifying question. In nutri-
42. For voûç as self-cognition, see III.4.429b5-10, where self-comprehension is seen as a product of under-
standing the object, and Metaphysics, A.7.1072M9, where "intellect cognizes itself by participation in the 
intelligible object." At Metaphysics, A.9.1074b33-1075a3, Aristotle compares the self-comprehension of 
vôriaiç to other forms of awareness which are conscious of themselves only èv rcapépyo) (b35-36). See J. 
OWENS, "A Note on Aristotle De Anima 3.4,429b9," Phoenix 30 (1976), reprinted in CATAN, 1981, p. 99-
108, for a discussion of the continuity of the doctrine of self-cognition in these texts. See KAHN, 1981, 
p. 413. 
43.III.4.429a24-27, b4-5, (cf. 429a29-b4) argues that mind is separate ; BRENTANO, 1867, p. 115-128, inter-
prets Aristotle to be arguing for why mind must be separate from body. I interpret the argument to mean 
that mind is not "bodily" in the sense of having a particular organ through which it works, and which sets 
up a dualism of self and other, but that it is "embodied" in the sense that it depends on a bodily situation in 
that precisely what voûç does is make the whole body of its world (voûç naGriTiKéç) an act of self-
cognition just as, again, carpentry theory is really the organizing of xà <j>aiv6u.eva of carpentry. On the in-
terpretation of this argument in Aristotle, see also BENARDETE, 1975, 614-619, esp. 615. 
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tion, "what is" is known, but only in its nutritiveness, that is, in terms of the subject's 
interests. In sense, the world is known, not by its own standards, but in terms of the 
various modes of its "sensibleness," that is, in terms of the way the sensing soul is 
capable of apprehending it. So, at these levels, one never knows some "pure object," 
but only the subject-object relation, that is, the object as already structured in terms 
of the subject's prejudice. 
But if Aristotle is not Descartes, he is not Kant either ; the object ultimately 
sought by knowledge is not some "thing-in-itself ' which is defined as the thing out-
side any relation to a knower.44 Rather, the object sought is that with which organ-
isms are involved. The desired object is not the thing seen from no perspective, but 
the thing seen from the proper (that is, rational and human) perspective. Aristotle 
makes a parallel point in another context. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle answers the question, "about what do we 
deliberate ?" : 
We ought presumably to call not what a fool or a madman would deliberate about, but 
what a sensible man would deliberate about, a subject of deliberation [...]. We deliberate 
about things that are in our power and can be done, (III.3.1112al9-21, 30-31, trans. W.D. 
Ross). 
There are three points to note here : (i) the distinction made between adequate and in-
adequate approaches to deliberation is made in terms of subjective conditions ; (ii) 
the true subjective condition is not an absence of perspective, but the proper one ; and 
(iii) this proper perspective is the human one, that is, it is the world as it is for the 
kinds of beings we are that is our proper object. This is the spirit in which knowing in 
general must be considered. 
All we have ever been aware of, by the very fact of that awareness, are things in 
which we are involved. Rather than thus making knowledge impossible, however, 
this fact of involvement is what makes knowledge possible. It is these things with 
which we are involved — xà ^pàyu-aia — which we seek to understand ; it is the 
world we knowing animals inhabit that we can know about, and it is the only thing 
worth knowing about.45 In our investigations of the processes of psychic uniting with 
the world, then, we do not want to say something which has no bearing on our situa-
tion ; to recall the quotation with which we started, we want to say "something worth 
44. Contra BARNES, 1986, who seems to uncritically accept the sceptic's purported phenomenology of con-
sciousness (p. 51) and criticizes Aristotle on this basis. In defense of Aristotle, Barnes gives a powerful 
"soteriological" interpretation to Aristotle's teleology and psychology, wherein the posited teleological 
"fit" of the world to our perceptual apparatus is justified by the fact of our survival (p. 56-57, 63) ; I think 
this general strategy of starting from the premise of success and then arguing back to the necessary condi-
tions for that success does do justice to Aristotle's thinking, but Barnes backs off from carrying out the im-
plications of this for intellect, claiming that "truth" cannot be treated in this way, and that therefore Aris-
totle is prey to scepticism (p. 74). But surely it is Barnes' conception of truth which the sceptic must find 
problematic : what does Barnes mean by truth ? Is truth universal assent ? Is it necessary assent ? I suspect 
he means something like "the way it actually is," but surely the Aristotelian point is that there are only 
ways — or there is only a way — it potentially is ; being is actual only in relation to voûç ; its actuality is 
the relation to cognition, in which we participate. 
45. Note that this does not preclude knowledge of the unmoved mover, and so on, inasmuch as the order of 
nature and its governing powers and bodies are members of the world as we inhabit it. 
797 
JOHN EDWARD RUSSON 
saying." So of course our account must be Korea xfrv (|)avTaoiav : it must be about the 
(f>aivô|Li£va, about the way things have been made visible to us according to our natu-
ral interests. 
Seen in this light, Aristotle's attitude that the world is rational, or for conscious-
ness makes clear sense. As we have just seen the only world we are interested in is 
the world which is, by the very fact of our being involved, necessarily "for" con-
sciousness.46 In saying that the world is rational, one is only saying exactly what the 
sceptic charges, namely, that in reflecting on itself, the self gets to know itself and 
only itself ; indeed, just as the sceptic demands, the task is for it to properly recognize 
as its own self what really is its own self. The self here, however, is, as we have seen, 
the involved self, so it is not a self known by introspection ; it is known by getting to 
know the world which defines the self, for what the self always is is an identification 
with its object. Self-cognition requires, then, a thoroughgoing familiarity with that 
object. Aristotle does not think that the mind can penetrate to the essence of itself and 
of things by sitting by the fire in a winter dressing-gown and meditating ; Aristotelian 
contemplation presupposes an thorough acquaintance with the subject-matter.47 One 
who would know must first go out and look — get involved — for only through get-
ting to know one's situation can one get to know one's self. As in Metaphysics A the 
TÉ%vr| which produces the reasoned fact presupposes a possession of the facts. 
In the order of time, then, one initially has knowledge of "the other." Through 
this other, however, and because the self is the condition of the other, one can come 
to know oneself, for the other reveals to the self how it (the self) lets things be. The 
highest recognition of self is the recognition of self as such a condition of the other. 
All the grades of knowing except voûç 7tovrruKÔç are overcomings of a pre-existent 
distance, that is, the division into the two terms which provide the extremes of the 
relation (self and other) are already fixed ; the acts of such knowings overcome this 
distance by destroying the integrity of one contrary through making one extreme 
identical with the other, (nutrition transforming the object, and sensation the subject). 
Noûç, however, is the true unity from which duality is generated. At the lower levels, 
the object is received on alien terms (in terms defined by its subject). Pure knowledge 
would be knowledge of the object in terms of itself, where it is not distorted by hav-
ing to measure up to what is alien to it. This pure knowledge is achieved when the 
subject recognizes that in knowing the object it is knowing itself, that is, the object is 
the subject ; in this case, there is no opposition between the two extremes. Such a 
46.1 thus agree with J. OWENS, "Forward," in CATAN, 1981, that "for [Aristotle] all human knowledge is sol-
idly grounded in the things experienced in the course of everyday life. These things are obvious and acces-
sible to all inquirers," (p. VI, emphasis added), though perhaps not in the exact sense he intends. It is inso-
far as we seek to know xa <JKXIV6U.£VCX that knowledge is possible ; accessibility is the very way of being of 
xa <j)cuv6u.eva and thus the objects of knowledge are in principle knowable by all. In this sense, then, the 
sceptic who claims to only identify an inability to make sense is misdescribing his or her experience in that 
the world is always given as already making sense such that things qua experienced are meaningful and 
demand of us that we fulfdl them by recognizing the intelligibility they offer us. 
47. My defense of the logical form of Aristotle's approach to historical cognition does not mean that any criti-
cism of his account of his predecessors is precluded ; if a criticism is to be made, it must be based on the 
quality of Aristotle's familiarity with and use of the evidence. 
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situation occurs in the self-reflection of the unified voûç, which has no contrary be-
cause it is its own object (III.6.430b23-26) ; in the order of being, it is the original 
unity which splits itself, whereas the others unifications are imitations which attempt 
to regain unity over a pre-established distance.48 In lower psychic activities, the soul 
provides the unifying structure for its "other." In vo-ûç the object is the proper object 
and known on its own terms because the object is this unifying ground of things, 
which is vo-ûç itself.49 To return, then, to the questionably translated passage from 
III.4, (429a 18-22), voûç is pure (àuAyriç) because in it no otherness remains ultimate ; 
an alien presence would preclude its complete se//-possession.50 
This conception of voûç as concrete self-knowledge allows us to see vo-ûç as the 
basis of the whole Aristotelian doctrine of soul, and that in relation to which the con-
cept of \\fvx*\ is unified. We began by showing how Aristotle's epistemology is con-
tinuous with his doctrine of soul, which means we showed knowing to be animative, 
an ensouling, and here we see what that means for full-fledged cognition. If knowing 
is animative rather than representative, this means that the mind is not a theatre in 
which the subject's re-presentations of the object are displayed ; rather, knowledge is 
something the knower does to its object : the object is made subject (\)7toKEtu,£vov) to 
the ruling (Kpaxelv), to the accusing (Kcrcrryopelv), of the knower. Cognition means 
taking the materials of cognition (vo-ûç TcaBrrriKoc) and activating them, bringing 
them to life. Real knowledge comes when the method of animating the object is itself 
supplied by the object, that is, when the knowing is the object's ^//-animation, and, 
as in all cognition, this involves the knowing agent identifying with the object, in this 
case, in such a way as to recognize that the desire for this self-conscious self-
cognition is what really characterizes the essence of the object. Thus formally we can 
see that the ultimate object must be vo-ûç, and, consequently, so too must self-
thinking vo-ûç be the subject, and his conclusion also follows if we reflect on the 
content of this doctrine of animative epistemology : knowing wants to know its 
situation, and what is happening in a situation of knowing is a self-ensouling. And, 
finally, we can see why understanding must take the form of retrospective compre-
48. A. KOSMAN, "Divine Being and Divine Thinking in Metaphysics Lambda," in J. CLEARY, éd., Proceedings 
of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. Ill (University Press of America, 1988), p. 165-
188, very nicely articulates a parallel version of the argument I am making : "Thinking is an activity whose 
object is not outside itself, and it therefore does not depend on the perfection of any external being for it to 
be complete. Note, however, that the same may be said of all modes of animate awareness. In seeing, for 
example, sight becomes one with the object seen, and seeing is characteristically invoked by Aristotle as an 
instance of an energeia whose end is contained within itself. But this is not an objection ; it is merely to re-
alize the cogency of ALEXANDER'S suggestion that "nous" is in fact the paradigm instance and thus the 
arche of the many animate modes of awareness." (p. 184, my emphasis) See also p. 185 : "In one sense, 
nous is our capacity to think, as we say, of things. In another it is the arche of [...] episteme. But in the most 
general sense it is capable of being these things because it is the arche of awareness in general ; thus Aris-
totle's hint [...] that animals have a rudimentary form of nous in their general capacity to discriminate ; [...] 
nous is only the purest form of that general power of cognitive awareness and discrimination that is in-
creasingly revealed in scala naturae." 
49. Cf. Metaphysics, A.7, 9, esp. 1074b35-1075a5. 
50.1 translate, "Thus it is necessary, since it comprehends everything, that it be unmixed, just as Anaxagoras 
says, in order that it may command, that is, in order that it may know ; for something alien appearing on the 
side will prevent and block." On the translation of the last clause, see HICKS Aristotle's De Anima 
(Cambridge, 1907), note ad loc. (429a20). 
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hension, for to be this agent who thus brings the object (which is one's lived situa-
tion) to bear on itself requires, however, a thoroughgoing familiarity with that object, 
since "the other" is precisely the material out of which the self which is the object of 
noetic self-cognizance is to be formed. 
Now, having moved from the immediately most apparent form of soul (nutrition) 
to the intrinsically most apparent (self-cognizing voûç), we can reverse our gaze and 
see all the psychology (and indeed all of physics) as an anticipation of the Aristote-
lian noetic, that is, all psychical (or physical) activity is primitive self-cognition. This 
point, indeed, allows us to see the continuity of the basic Aristotelian project with the 
doctrine of the unmoved mover in Metaphysics A. 
We have provided a ground for seeing all psychic activity as primitive identifica-
tion of self and other and (what really amounts to the same thing) primitive self-
cognition, and it is ultimately from the definition of x|/t)%r| as the first evT£A.e%eux of a 
naturally organized body that we have derived this orientation. But all physical sub-
stances can certainly be understood, mutatis mutandis, in the same fashion, for once 
again the key to the existence of the physical substance is the intrinsic principle of 
motion which organizes the relationship of it and its world. Now it is from the point 
of view of noetic self-cognition that we can understand what it is that each of these 
primitive substantial functionings is, which is to say that, again, what being means in 
relation to each kind of physical substance is different, but they are all understandable 
qua beings through a focal reference to that primary instance which is the self-
thinking thought ; it is the perfected achievement of that which each lesser being 
"lispingly" accomplishes through its self-activity in a situation of given otherness.51 
Rather than pursue the implications of this account for the interpretation of the Aris-
totelian metaphysics and cosmology, however, we must now wrap up our treatment 
of \\roxt\ and voûç, and return to the issue of Aristotle's historiography. 
We have seen that experience of an other seems chronologically primary, and, 
similarly, within the individual, voûç appears as a late development, but that in truth 
voûç is the origin and ground of all.52 In keeping with something like the àvd|ivr|oiç 
of which Socrates speaks,53 one can say that the history of one's psychic development 
is the history of working up the appropriate psychic ëÇiç which will allow one to ac-
51.1 thus cannot agree with D. MODRAK, "Aristotle on Thinking," in J. CLEARY, éd., Proceedings of the Bos-
ton Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. II (University Press of America, 1987), p. 209-236, who 
contends (p. 230-233) that the argument for the unmoved mover in Metaphysics A is a discardable doctrine, 
present only because Aristotle felt it forced upon him by other aspects of his argument ; on the contrary, if 
Aristotle had not made the argument explicitly, his doctrine of nature would require us to supply it. 
COLLINGWOOD, 1960, p. 80-92, likewise argues for the consistency of and necessity for the doctrine of the 
unmoved mover within the Aristotelian philosophy. R. NORMAN, "Aristotle's Philosopher God," Phrone-
sis, 14 (1969), reprinted in BARNES et ai, 1975-1979, vol. IV, p. 63-74, works at understanding Metaphys-
ics, A.7 and 9 by comparison with De Anima, III A, but his claim (p. 95) that Aristotle's empiricislic error 
of modeling voûç on sense and its givenness of the subject-object distinction seems to me to get Aristotle's 
doctrine exactly backward ; KOSMAN, 1988, on the contrary gives an excellent interpretation of the self-
thinking thought in the context of an Aristotelian psychology. See also BENARDETE, 1975, p. 621-622. 
52. Cf. III.5.430a20-21 and III.7.43la2-3. 
53. See, for example, Phaedo, 72e-75d. 
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tualize one's innate potential to participate in the universal voûç.54 We can turn now 
to appraise the implications of this analysis for determining the relation of Aristotle's 
historical method and his account of knowing. 
III. HISTORY AND KNOWING 
Burnet's criticism makes two charges against Aristotle. The first is that he ap-
praises his predecessors in his own terms, and the second, that he views his own 
philosophy as TO TI r\v eivca of the tradition. This criticism assumes that Aristotle's 
position pre-exists his analyses, and that it is by this already established system that 
he evaluates the others. If Aristotle's account of knowing is correct, however, such a 
situation is an impossibility. Unlike Athena, èmcrcf||iri does not spring up full-blown 
ex nihilo ; it can only exist on the basis of a ëÇiç of the relation of self to world. Ar-
istotle's knowing of the philosophical subject-matter has to have arisen from the tra-
dition, with the tradition supplying both the (subjective) method for questioning, and 
the (objective) material to be thought about. There is required a poietic act of re-
appropriation of this ëÇiç at a more unified level, but it is only because this ëÇiç is the 
Ô-ôvauiç of this activity that this appropriation can take place. 
What is this act of historical appropriation ? It is not the kind of appropriation 
one engages in in eating in which the other is forced to conform to a pre-existent self, 
nor is it a simply sensible appropriating in which one conforms oneself to a pre-
existent other ; rather, if the integrity of both subject and object is to be respected, it 
must be a noetic appropriation. Let us summarize the logic of Aristotle's historical 
vorioiç. First, there is the recognition by Aristotle that there is a phenomenon to be 
understood. It is this very act of looking for a single essence which provides the 
ground of unity. Aristotle's explananda pre-exist his analysis, but not as explananda, 
and it is only by his distancing himself from his subject-matter and taking it as a sin-
gle whole, that the past becomes a past. This viewing of the situation, furthermore, 
includes as part of its content the very act of looking which Aristotle is performing, 
that is, it is only by viewing as a totality the history leading up to and including his 
own viewing that the view is truly a view of the whole. The kind of viewing that is 
required in order to reveal a rational and complete whole is the method which sees 
each articulation as itself necessary or "for the best" : this is the Platonic method of 
theodicy and dialectic. It is necessary, then, for Aristotle to view himself as the cul-
mination of the tradition because his viewing is part of the whole, that is, he must see 
how his summing up of the tradition is "for the best" ; and he is right to do so for, as 
we have just seen, his viewing does supply the essential question which allows the 
rest of the history (including his own act) to be united as an answer. Real knowledge, 
54. KAHN, 1981, p. 410-411, discusses the relation of personal intellect and intellect as such, and the role of 
education in developing the capacity to participate in cognition ; see especially, "the process of learning 
develops our potential intellect from a neutral capacity to a trained state : in becoming familiar with the 
principles of science we acquire the hexis of nous as an intellectual virtue, 'the arche of science by which 
we know the definitions.' [...] As our personal nous becomes actualized in the possession and exercise of 
the principles of science, nothing happens to the active intellect." (Compare KAHN, 1966, p. 29-30.) 
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then, only occurs in the viewing which sees itself as having been (potentially) present 
all along ; indeed the viewing must see its past as compelling it — the viewing — to 
act as it does. It occurs when the viewing subject recognizes itself as having always 
been present in the object, recognizes itself as "what it (the voiycov) always was be-
ing," that is, as TO TI r\v elvai, as what the situation has been demanding. Aristotle's 
philosophy, then, is the tradition self-united from a single perspective in an active 
synthesis : through Aristotle's act, the traditional corpus ensouls itself. 
It is precisely by recognizing itself in the tradition, then, and by viewing the tra-
dition in Aristotelian terms, that Aristotle's position demonstrates its maturity. To 
view, on the contrary, Aristotle's position in terms of the "material" out of which it 
has grown (that is, the tradition) is the one-sided approach, for it presents the Aristo-
telian "harmony" of the material as derivative and dependent upon the "body" which 
it harmonizes, and it ignores the primacy of VOÔJÇ. The priority, then, must be re-
versed such that the Aristotelian account is, to use a Platonism, the "ÔVTCÛÇ ôv" which 
is the true source of the preceding material : the final cause is really the dominant 
element of which the tradition is the bodily realization. This means, then, that the 
drive to vôrioiç Tfjç vofioeœç must have been potentially present from the start, 
(exactly as the drive to be recognized as oneself was potentially present in the object 
of self-reflection), in order that the Aristotelian synthesis could truly be the defining, 
governing, and final cause ; Aristotle's act actualizes the potentiality of the past to 
have been anticipating the act. 
Of course, saying that his philosophy is the last and best does not guarantee that 
Aristotle's philosophy is such. Whether it is or not depends on how thoroughly he 
has appropriated his subject-matter, and how consistent his principles are.55 But it is 
true, at any rate, that, on Aristotle's principles, the highest philosophy would have to 
be one which claimed itself to be, and which saw itself as, active in its own past. If 
Burnet or any other, then, wants to criticize Aristotle's approach to his predecessors, 
he must be prepared to take on the whole Aristotelian psychology with which it is 
consistent. 
CONCLUSION 
Like Aristotle, my analysis has "contributed" to the corpus under analysis, not by 
adding a new feature, but by looking to see how the text is rational, and this reading 
too sees itself as TO TI r\v elvai of Aristotle's book precisely because it tries to be a 
self-justifying reading, that is, the reading aims to be the one which the text retro-
spectively shows itself to have always been demanding : this (way of) reading is what 
the text itself requires as its own self-conscious completion, found by providing a 
comprehensive — and inquisitive — space within which the "method" of the text 
(expressed in the single dynamic definition of soul) can be brought to bear on its own 
"body" (comprised by the multiple examples of knowing). What we should have 
55.COLLINGWOOD, I960, Part I essentially argues that Aristotle's claim to have succeeded at bringing about 
the philosophy for which his predecessors strived is sound. 
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learned from Aristotle's account of how soul takes up its material conditions is that 
soul is always the enactment of an interpretive unity, which is an identification of it-
self with its materiality. This enactment is always constrained with respect to both 
subject-matter and method, in that it can only energize what is available to it. This 
means that we can only ever exist as act of animation in which our inherited sub-
stance — our "habits" — must speak to our concerns. Thus to read Aristotle now, ac-
cording to principles of Aristotle's own philosophy, means that we must find him to 
be engaged with our tradition, just as Aristotle himself demands of his predecessors 
that they speak to his situation. Thus an Aristotelian reading of Aristotle must show 
that the concerns about subjectivity which are so much a part of our ë£iç are already 
implicit in Aristotle, and have been awaiting our interpretive act of bringing them to 
self-consciousness. Thus "self-consciousness," and our philosophical tradition, must 
already be present in Aristotle's psychology. My reading is thus the attempt to be the 
fourth of the ensoulments, that is, energizings of ëÇeiç, that we have considered : the 
first is the energizing of body by soul (Section I) ; the second is the energizing of the 
object of knowledge by which a ëÇiç is turned into a cognitive ôûvau-iç (Section II) ; 
the third is Aristotle's (self-)energizing of the tradition in his historical (self-)cogni-
tion which in turn is his own philosophy (Section III) ; if my attempt in this essay at 
energizing Aristotle's text by forcing it to interpret itself has been successful, then it 
is the fourth.56 
56.1 would like especially to thank Douglas Hutchinson and Father Joseph Owens who led the seminar in 
which this essay was born. Ken McGovern, Eugene Bertoldi, Gregory Nagy, Jay Lampert, Abe Schoener, 
Peter Simpson, Patricia Fagan, David Morris, Ken Cheung and Evan Thompson have also offered helpful 
discourse about Aristotle and Greek philosophy. Versions of this material were presented to the Philosophy 
Forum at the University of Toronto, the Philosophy Department at Queen's University, the Classics De-
partment at Dalhousie University, and the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. 
Roger Shiner's generous editorial remarks on a much earlier draft have helped the paper immensely. The 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada provided the doctoral and post-doctoral fel-
lowships which supported the research for this paper both at the University of Toronto Department of Phi-
losophy and at the Harvard University Department of the Classics. 
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